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PRINCIPAL AND PRACTICAL FOUNDATIONS OF 
A GLOBAL CONSTITUTIONAL ORDER 
ALLEN N. SULTAN∗
“No great improvements in the lot of mankind are possible until a 
great change takes place in the fundamental constitution of their 
modes of thought.” 
—John Stuart Mill1
I. DESPERATELY SEEKING THE “OUGHT” 
Experts of human behavior tell us that people first band together for the 
basic essentials of life: food and protection from the elements through 
clothing and shelter; and then, the vital need for security of the person. 
Thus, the security of the group grows out of, and in theory exists for, the 
security of each of its members.  
Constitutional systems, therefore, do not arise in a vacuum, rather they 
are the product of a number of specific preexisting characteristics and exist 
for specific reasons. Look to the preamble of the basic documents of any 
political society and you will find these objectives most affirmatively 
proclaimed. Peace, security, happiness—these are their objectives. To 
achieve them, political societies or polities promulgate constitutions. 
Sadly, some populations include additional condemnable objectives, 
defiling Immanuel Kant’s categorical imperative of unconditional and 
universal binding moral obligations. It is in this manner that the troubles 
begin among our subsisting nation-states. Let us then inspect Kant’s 
proposition—this alleged “command of reason”—in the context of past 
and continuing challenges to our global society.2
 
 
 ∗  Former Ford Foundation Fellow and Fulbrighter in France and Japan, Allen N. Sultan is a 
Professor of Law at the University of Dayton School of Law. He is a former Chairman of the Section 
on Constitutional Law of the Association of American Law Schools and presently serves as a member 
of the Scientific and Professional Advisory Council to the United Nations Criminal Justice Division. 
This Article is an excerpt of a work in progress entitled, Towards a Paradigm of Global 
Constitutionalism. Copyright © 2002. Allen N. Sultan. All rights reserved. 
 1. See generally JOHN STUART MILL, AUTOBIOGRAPHY & OTHER WRITINGS (Jack Stillinger 
ed., 1969).
 2. WEBSTER’S NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 175 (1975). See, e.g., JOHN H. HALLOWELL, 
MAIN CURRENTS IN MODERN POLITICAL THOUGHT 242 (1950): 
A categorical imperative is one which directs us to act in a certain way because of the intrinsic 
value of that way of acting. It commands that kind of conduct which is objectively necessary 
without regard to any personal advantage, desire, or more ultimate goal. And Kant declares that 
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In the human quest for a political philosophy, providence has afforded 
us only two general paths. We could choose to travel down the dusty road 
of Machiavelli, Hobbes, Hegel, and Nietzsche. Should we do so, we end 
up living in a society designed by one of their disciples, such as Lenin or 
the Nazi Alfred Rosenberg. Or, embracing the other option, we can take 
the more anciently rooted and increasingly enlightened road of Aristotle, 
Cicero, Gratius, Kant, Locke, Rousseau, Voltaire, Montesquieu, and Hume 
and live in a society designed by one of their disciples, such as Thomas 
Jefferson. History dictates that these options of philosophical choice have 
clashed during the past sixty years of the twentieth century—with 
humanity and the dignity of the individual being the victors! That victory 
is why we must continue to overcome challenges thrust upon us by 
psychopaths, such as Slobodan Milosevic and Saddam Hussein, which, 
cruelly, providence has sporadically imposed upon our history. 
When the United Nations Charter was signed in San Francisco on June 
26, 1945, its first six words were—and remain—“we the peoples of the 
United Nations.”3 Not “we the nations or future member nations,” nor “we 
the nations representing the peoples,” but simply “we the peoples.” 
Jefferson’s jussive (“When . . . one people . . . with another”) in the United 
States Declaration Of Independence was, therefore, given universal 
application in the Charter. Peace with, and not at the cost of, human rights 
was then combined with individual dignity to become the global ends to 
be sought.  
These words in the United Nations Preamble created a watershed, a 
defining moment, in the still nascent struggle to fashion a constitutional 
order for our rapidly developing global society. At the time, few would 
have attempted to contest these objectives. There was no choice in the 
matter, as these efforts were mandated by the stark reality of clear 
necessity. They merely crystallized the costly lesson from the first half of 
the twentieth century and created hope for a fresh start after the slaughter 
and destruction of World War II. With the failure of the League of 
Nations, the world and its peoples had disdainfully fallen into a quicksand 
of despair—due in a very large part to the simple lack of minimally 
adequate international institutions of social organization. 
 
 
there is only one such imperative: Act so that the maxim of your act might be made a universal 
principle. 
 3. U.N. CHARTER pmbl. (emphasis added). 
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II. HUMAN RIGHTS FOUNDERS OF THE UNITED NATIONS 
Where, after all, do universal human rights begin? In small places, 
close to home—so close and so small they cannot be seen on any 
map of the world. Yet they are the world of the individual person: 
the neighborhood he lives in; the school or college he attends; the 
factory, farm or office where he works. Such are the places where 
every man, woman and child seeks equal justice, equal opportunity, 
equal dignity without discrimination. Unless these rights have 
meaning there, they have little meaning anywhere. Without 
concerned citizen action to uphold them close to home, we shall 
look in vain for progress in the larger world.  
—Eleanor Roosevelt4
Academic and professional rumblings promoting a post-World War II 
international institutional order furthering humanitarian ends began years 
before the successful end of that wrenching experience. All knew that the 
raging conflict was nefarious in its conception and telling in its resolution. 
Given the weighty consequences, political foundations had to be 
established to avoid its repetition. This process commenced almost an 
entire year before the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor on December 7, 
1941, brought the United States unabatedly into the fray. 
In January of 1941, President Franklin D. Roosevelt appealed to the 
United States Congress for open support of those nations that, in his 
words, were fighting to defend the “Four Freedoms—freedom of speech, 
freedom of religion, freedom from want, freedom from fear.”5 Seven 
months later he met with Winston Churchill in Argentina Bay, 
Newfoundland, and on August 14, 1941, issued the Atlantic Charter that 
embraced these freedoms as well as other objectives, including 
implementation of the principle of democracy.6
 
 
 4. Eleanor Roosevelt, Remarks at a ceremony in the United Nations, N.Y., Mar. 20, 1958; 
reprinted in Richard B. Bilder, Rethinking International Human Rights: Some Basic Questions, 197 
WISC. L. REV. 171, 178 n.11 (1969). See also BLANCHE WIESEN COOK, ELEANOR ROOSEVELT: VOL. 
ONE, 1884-1933 18 (1992) (quoting the writing of Eleanor Roosevelt from 1958). 
 5. Samuel Eliot Morison, THE OXFORD HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN PEOPLE 998 (1965). 
 6. Id. at 999.  The enduring impact of the “Four Freedoms” subsists in the private domain in the 
Commission on Human Security. Presently co-chaired by Ms. Sadako Ogata, former United Nations 
High Commissioner for Refugees and Professor Amartya Sen, Nobel laureate in economics and master 
of Trinity College, Cambridge, the commission “responds to United Nations Secretary-General Kofi 
Annan’s call at the Millennium Summit to broaden the world’s view of peace and security to include 
the ‘freedom from want’ and the ‘freedom from fear’.” XXIV Fulbright Assoc. Newsletter, 2002, No. 3, 
at 2-3. Consisting of twelve members, it is designed to “promote wider international acceptance of 
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p155 Sultan book pages.doc  11/19/2003   12:10 PM 
 
 
 
 
 
158   WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY GLOBAL STUDIES LAW REVIEW [VOL. 3:155 
 
 
 
 
The following year, William Draper Lewis, who in 1942 was Director 
of the (private) American Law Institute (ALI), took the lead in seeking an 
international statement that would manifest and serve to implement the 
“essential human rights” contained in the Four Freedoms.7 To this end, he 
approached Doctor Ricardo J. Alfaro, the former President of Panama who 
was serving as Director of the American International Law Institute. For 
assistance, Alfaro turned to his friend, Professor Manley O. Hudson of 
Harvard Law School.8 In this manner, the efforts of these men commenced 
shortly after Pearl Harbor, and culminating some two years later, resulted 
in the ALI’s Statement of Essential Human Rights.9
Drawing upon extensive private, pre-war international legal activity,10 
this key inceptive international document was prepared with the active 
participation of experts from twelve foreign nations,11 “probably 
[representing] all existing cultures. . . .”12 Fortuitously, the ALI Statement 
would prove to have significant influence13 on what, at the war’s end, 
became known as the “International Bill of Rights.” Combined with the 
joint undertaking of the American and Canadian Bar Associations’ 1944 
International Law of the Future,14 as well as with other works at that 
time,15 the human rights tradition of the Enlightenment was, with these 
efforts, actively updated to serve our post-war renaissance of international 
 
 
human security and its underlying imperatives, develop the concept of human security as an 
operational tool for policy formulation and implementation, identify critical and pervasive threats to 
human security, and propose action to result in practical improvements.” Id. In sum, their mission is to 
raise the quality of life, by realizing “concrete improvements for threatened peoples throughout the 
world.” Id. 
 7. Louis B. Sohn, How American International Lawyers Prepared for the San Francisco Bill of 
Rights, 89 AM. J. INT’L L. 540, 546 (1995) [hereinafter How American Lawyers Prepared]. 
 8. Id. at 546-47. 
 9. Id. at 550-53. 
 10. Id. at 541-46. 
 11. Id. at 549 n.38. 
 12. Id. at 549. 
 13. Id. at 553. 
 14. Id. (citing American and Canadian Bar Associations. International Law of the Future: 
Postulates, Principles and Proposals (Jan. 1, 1944), reprinted in 38 AM. J. INT’L L. 41 (Supp. 1944)) 
[hereinafter American & Canadian Bar Associations, International Law of the Future]. 
 15. Sohn, who was very active throughout this period also cites “several reports of the 
Commission to Study the Organization of Peace, which started dealing with human rights in 1940, 
including a thoughtful report by Quincy Wright.” How American International Lawyers Prepared, 
supra note 7, at 553 n.45.  As this writer’s first professor of international law while a graduate student 
at the University of Chicago in mid-1950s, I can personally attest to Quincy Wright’s inspiring 
commitment and consuming efforts in the cause of human rights. His legacy as both a teacher and a 
scholar still guide me some five decades later. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol3/iss1/6
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normative jurisprudence.16 Fittingly, at war’s end in 1945, Professor Hersh 
Lauterpacht published his influential volume, “An International Bill of 
Rights of Man.”17
The individuals who were the architects of our present day regime of 
human rights were well aware of the axiom that “those who ignore history 
are doomed to repeat it.” They desperately sought to avoid yet another 
instance where “popular discontent inevitably starts the vicious cycle of 
revolution, despotic rule and international war.”18 They also knew that, 
fundamentally, the key to success rests in a regime of ethical jurisprudence 
that guarantees us global security for individual liberty.19
Not surprisingly, therefore, the ALI Statement contained in its 
preamble the essential concept: “The function of the state is to promote 
conditions under which the individual can be most free.”20 To this end, it 
placed intellectual liberty up front: 
ARTICLE 1 
Freedom of Religion 
Freedom of belief and of worship is the right of every one. 
The state has a duty to protect this freedom.  
ARTICLE 2 
Freedom of Opinion 
Freedom to form and hold opinions and to receive opinions and 
information is the right of every one. 
The state has a duty to protect this right. 
ARTICLE 3 
Freedom of Speech 
Freedom of expression is the right of every one. 
 
 
 16. See American and Canadian Bar Associations, International Law of the Future, supra note 
14, at 41. 
 17. THE INTERNATIONAL BILL OF RIGHTS 247, 463 (Louis Henkin ed., 1981). 
 18. How American International Lawyers Prepared, supra note 7, at 548 quoting 20 A.L.I. 
PROC. 184 (1943). 
 19. Id. See also id. at 545 (describing how James Brown Scott, the President of the Institute de 
Droit International in 1929, quoted the 1776 Virginia Declaration of Rights, which embraced the 
primacy of liberty and civil equality). 
 20. Id. at 550 (quoting a committee appointed by the American Law Institute, Statement of 
Essential Human Rights, 243 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 18, 18 (1946) [hereinafter 
Statement of Essential Human Rights]). 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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The state has a duty to refrain from arbitrary limitation of this 
freedom and to prevent denial of reasonable access to channels of 
communication.21
For the realization of the two components of intellectual liberty—freedom 
of conscience, and freedom of expression—the ALI Statement delineated 
the basic principle of individual justice with its analogue of judicial 
autonomy: 
ARTICLE 7 
Fair Trial 
Every one has the right to have his criminal and civil liberties and 
his rights determined without undue delay by a fair public trial by a 
competent tribunal before which he has had opportunity for a full 
hearing.  
The state has a duty to maintain adequate tribunals and procedures to 
make this right effective.22
The ALI Statement also included the final important inter-related civil 
and political right, the precept of civil equality,23 as well as its analogue of 
democracy,24 the latter also forming a part of its preamble.25  
These were, and remain, the political, legal, and jurisprudential 
foundations of our post-war international governmental and human rights 
experience. As the fruition of these foundations continue to be pervasively 
articulated and implemented, we are increasingly enjoying the promise of 
centuries of humanitarian development. In our age of virtually instant 
mass destruction, failure in this ongoing dilative normative undertaking no 
 
 
 21. Id. at 551 (quoting Statement of Essential Human Rights, supra note 20, at 18). 
 22. Id. (emphasis added). 
 23. Article 17 
Equal Protection 
Every one has the right to protection against arbitrary discrimination in the provisions and 
application of the law because of race, religion, sex, or any other reason. 
Id. at 552 (quoting Statement of Essential Human Rights, supra note 20, at 26), 
 24. Article 16 
Participation in Government 
Every one has the right to take part in the government of his state.  
The state has a duty to conform to the will of the people as manifested by democratic elections. 
Id. at 551 (quoting Statement of Essential Human Rights, supra note 20, at 25). 
 25. The preamble states, “[t]o express those freedoms to which every human being is entitled and 
to assure that all shall live under a government of the people, by the people, for the people, this 
declaration is made.” Id. at 550 (quoting Statement of Essential Human Rights, supra note 20, at 18). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol3/iss1/6
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longer remains a viable option. The security that results from its success 
lies in the wisdom and courage of every successive generation. For each 
must respond to their own challenges arising from the evils that, 
unfortunately, also still inhabit the earth. Such desultory perpetrations of 
terror on the human community have been, and must continue to be, 
challenged with increasingly speedy success.  
III. MANDATE FOR THE NECESSARY GLOBAL INDIVIDUAL CONSENSUS 
“The most foolish notion of all is the belief that everything is just 
which is found in the customs or laws of nations.” 
—Cicero26
Sir Isaac Newton pronounced the key Enlightenment proposition more 
than three centuries ago: the universe is governed by universal laws and, 
therefore, is predictable.27 Yet, the overarching problem remains: fostering 
universal laws requires moral courage. With that vital quality, human 
reason that is implemented by determined leadership can increasingly 
perfect our global society. International peace and security, along with 
individual civil equality and justice under the rule of law—these are the 
delectations of intrepid leaders impelling institutionalized power. They are 
also the true political and social objectives of our system of universal law; 
they can be discovered and realized through simple human reason; and 
they are only compellingly implemented by propitious moral courage. 
Clearly, as we have seen from the failures of the past century, this 
essential combination of virtue and fortitude has too often been 
pathetically absent. The paucity of this vital dimension of character in 
those who sought, as well as those who presently seek and often obtain, 
political power has been the scourge of history. Winston Churchill, 
Franklin Roosevelt, and Harry Truman stand in stark contrast to this bitter, 
grievous fact. Students of our recent history know that the absence of such 
valiancy during the first half of the last century resulted in an incredible 
surfeit of human carnage and incineration. Any new paradigm of global 
constitutional development therefore requires, first and foremost, the 
consistent ascendance of moral courage in leadership. The future cannot 
afford its absence. The people of the world must demand that their leaders 
assert such moral courage! Then, and only then, will they enjoy the 
 
 
 26. Quoted in ANTHONY EVERITT, CICERO 176 (2001). 
 27. SAMUEL ENOCH STUMPF, PHILOSOPHY, HISTORY AND PROBLEMS 76, 210-11 (3d ed. 1971); 
GEORGE H. SABINE, A HISTORY OF POLITICAL THEORY 460, 550 (1937). 
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security that is engendered by enlightened global constitutional 
development. 
As we have seen, the foundational jurisprudential commitments to the 
norms and objectives of the United Nations Charter are, in human terms, 
compelling. When they are realized, overarching global communal 
interests should prevail. Harmonization of the inevitable differences 
among members of the international community will both foster and 
strengthen these global communal interests. With proper constitutional 
structures, the reasonable ambitions of nation states could and should be 
accommodated to the necessary demands of our enlightened global 
society.  
Common knowledge dictates that power is almost always directed by 
particular interests, and therefore, the threshold task is clear: institutions 
for the implementation of our immediate global communal interests must 
be more swiftly identified, recognized, and articulated. Then, and only 
then, can they begin to be more fully embraced. Once so recognized and 
implemented, they should serve to enhance the political will that 
increasingly actuates a common national behavior affecting the entire 
global community. 
A considerable amount of this essential global community reality has 
already been realized over the centuries through that body of customary 
international law known as “the responsibility of states.”28 That doctrine, 
however, has been conceptually a negative, “thou shalt not,” paradigm of 
limitations on Westphalian sovereignty. What is needed is a new, firm, 
and positively formulated paradigm of international constitutionalism: 
global democracy wedded to effective responsibility in the service of 
human rights. 
Nor should we shirk from this overarching objective. To be principled 
is not to be naive. Towards the end of his life, after the assent of Julius 
Caesar, Cicero concluded that the death of the Roman Republic resulted 
from the failure of its leaders to apply moral values.29 In contrast, success 
in the Second World War and Cold War have proved that the conscious 
exertion of power for the cause of human morality can be victorious. Thus, 
we should not hesitate to recognize that through the genesis of a proper, 
dilative global constitutionalism we can achieve a parallel victory in 
global statesmanship.  
As an universal enterprise, success in such a venture will represent 
 
 
 28. See, e.g., SAM BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 432-76 (4th ed., 
1990). 
 29. Id. at 244.  
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vindication of the precepts of fundamental natural law that are expressed 
in the purposes and principles of the United Nations Charter. Because a 
parallel version of these precepts exist in all major cultures, this natural 
law constitutes the foundation of all human rights. In the words of 
Mahatma Gandhi, “We must become the change we seek.” 
Where to begin the journey is not difficult to determine. When 
engaged, moral courage merely reflects the individual moral instincts 
common to all humankind. Jefferson called this happy quality, “the 
brightest gem with which the human character is studded.”30 His “common 
sense” Scottish application of natural law holds that this moral instinct, 
inbred in human nature, and therefore in humankind, leads to the 
interdependence of happiness. Jefferson, along with Adam, Franklin and 
Washington, knew that all decent members of society benefit from social 
virtue, each from exercising civic responsibility to help his or her fellow 
citizens.31 One is not surprised, therefore, by Jefferson’s confident 
conclusion that “the mass of mankind has not been born with saddles on 
their backs.”32
Extrapolating this creed to the international community has long ceased 
to be the sole domain of past humanistic visionaries like David Hume and 
Thomas Jefferson. As recently as 1965, the international jurist Wolfgang 
Friedmann pointed out: “‘[to] co-operate or perish’ is a stark fact, not an 
evangelistic aspiration.”33 His admonition is only enhanced now that the 
 
 
 30. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Thomas Law, July 5, 1814), in THOMAS JEFFERSON: 
WRITINGS 1333 (Merrill D. Peterson ed., 1884). Before coming to this conclusion, Jefferson made a 
conceptual distinction most relevant to those who insist on chauvinistic forms of “cultural relativism” 
in international human rights: 
Some have argued against the existence of a moral sense, by saying that if nature had given us 
such a sense . . . then nature would also have designated, by some particular ear-marks, the two 
sets of action which are, in themselves, the one virtuous and the other vicious. Whereas, we find, 
in fact, that the same actions are deemed virtuous in one country and vicious in another. The 
answer is that nature has constituted utility to man the standard and best of virtue. Men living in 
different countries, under different circumstances, different habits and regimens, may have 
different utilities; the same act, therefore, may be useful, and consequently virtuous in one country 
which is injurious and vicious in another differently circumstanced. I sincerely, then, believe . . . in 
the general existence of a moral instinct. I think it the brightest gem with which the human 
character is studded, and the want of it as more degrading than the most hideous of the bodily 
deformities. 
Id. at 1338. 
 31. George McKenna, The “Dualities” of Thomas Jefferson, FIRST THINGS, 53, 54. (June/July 
2000), http://www.firstthings.com/Ptissues/ft0006/articles/mckenna.html (last visited Oct. 5, 2003). 
See generally JEAN M. YARBROUGH, AMERICAN VIRTUES: THOMAS JEFFERSON ON THE CHARACTER 
OF A FREE PEOPLE (1998). 
 32. See McKenna, supra note 31. 
 33. Wolfgang Friedman, The Role of Int’l Law in the Conduct of International Affairs, 20 INT’L 
J. 158, 169 (1965). 
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planet has become even smaller, and the resulting challenges increasingly 
multi-polar. For example, our present dangers of global terror once again 
teach us that, left free and unchallenged, malignancy insidiously invades 
with pervasive and, at times, devastating effects. Like the plague, it does 
not respect political boundaries. That is why all civilized nations were 
easily compelled to swiftly agree to meet this latest, most pernicious 
global challenge—as did the United Nations Security Council.34
For these reasons, the marriage of moral instincts to global communal 
action lights up the path ahead. When melded together they animate the 
profoundly obvious first essential task of embracing the paradigm of a 
global community based upon a constitutional rule of law—one that is in 
the service of human rights. Simply stated, there are no pariah nations; 
there are only nations under the control of pariah leaders. There was a time 
when Olympic grants and Papal concordats lent unfortunate credibility—
yes even legitimacy—to such genocidal “leaders.” The “game” of 
diplomacy had to stay on course. Individual populations were deemed to 
be irrelevant in the precincts of international power politics. Positivism 
reigned supreme. 
Such was the previous diplomatic “wisdom.” The history of the past 
century records the price of those horrendous states of mind. We have 
learned, at great cost, that sociopathic megalomaniacs possessing political 
power have been the international community’s greatest imminent danger. 
Despicably, they have constituted the human embodiment of our present 
day analogue of the “saddles” to which Jefferson so sagaciously referred. 
Therein lies the first clear and necessary communal interest of the new 
paradigm of global constitutionalism: a mind set that instinctively rejects 
such public evil and acts upon it. 
Consider the following true event, most probably repeated untold 
times: Serbian paramilitary forces enter an Albanian town in Kosovo. The 
men and boys are shipped off, probably never to be seen again. The 
mature women are forced to cook and serve them a meal—while naked. In 
the early evening some paramilitaries enter the place of female 
confinement and take away very young pretty girls. Not too long 
thereafter, sharp screams break the still of the night.  
Through all this, the individual and collective Serbian people permitted 
 
 
 34. S. Res. 1269, U.N. SCOR, 4053rd mtg. (1999), http://ods-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/ 
Gen/N99/303/92/pdf/N9930392.pdf?OpenElement (last visited Oct. 5, 2003); S. Res. 1368, 
U.N.SCOR, 4370th mtg. (2001), http://ods-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/NO1/553/82/PDF/ 
N0153382 (last visited Oct. 5, 2003); S. Res. 1373,U.N.SCOR 4370th mtg. (2001), http://ods-dds-
ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/No1/557/43/PDF/N0155743 (last visited Oct. 5, 2003). 
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their government to so act in their name. This is not so surprising. After 
all, the individual and collective German people sat on their hands while 
Communists and other political dissenters, and then the Blacks, Jews, 
Roma, homosexuals, mentally ill or developmentally delayed, and any 
others deemed by authorities to be “useless eaters,” simply disappeared in 
a systematic manner. All of this occurred, while “acceptable” Germans 
were increasingly enjoying the riches of a conquered Europe.  
The basic element wanting, then, is that all peoples must respond to the 
existence of such evil at home. They must eschew it at the outset. Then, 
and only then, will both they and others be secure from death at the hands 
of the government. Then, and only then, will “democide” no longer appear 
on our television screens. 
Thus, we must rapidly work toward the time when the peoples of every 
nation demand democracy to secure their own human rights. The essential 
objective is a global mind set that will not permit the camel of tyranny to 
get its nose under any national tent. The mere suggestion that public evil 
could be a future outcome of suppositional leaders’ policies must produce 
an instantaneous public response. That is the key, the necessary global 
individual responsibility, the consensus that underpins the new global 
constitutional paradigm. 
When, to paraphrase Louis Brandeis, public action is seen as a political 
duty,35 individuals everywhere will enjoy the peace and human rights they 
so pervasively desire. Time and again history dictates that when the need 
for that courage of individual and cumulative moral action is lacking, we 
enter the leviathan, and with it a political deluge. At bottom, the fate of 
peoples everywhere does not lay in their stars, but simply in themselves.36
IV. OUR CENTRAL CORE OF GLOBAL MORALITY 
“We do not wish to gloss over or ignore the serious differences among 
the individual religions. However, they should not hinder us from 
proclaiming publicly those things which we already hold in common and 
which we jointly affirm, each on the basis of our own religious or ethical 
grounds.”  
—Küng and Kuschel37
 
 
 35. Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375 (1927). 
 36. See WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, JULIUS CAESAR, act 1, sc. 2, lines 140-41 (David Bevington 
ed., Addison-Wesley 4th ed. 1997) (addressing Brutus, Cassius states “[t]he fault, dear Brutus, is not in 
our stars, [b]ut in ourselves, that we are underlings.”). 
 37. A Global Ethic: The Declaration of the Parliament of the World’s Religions 22 (Hans Küng 
& Karl-Josef Kuschel eds., 1993). 
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The ubiquitous conflict between faith and reason, mutually inhabiting 
the human psyche, constantly revives the inquiring mind. That sage of 
practical reason, Aristotle, who continues to frame so much of our 
everyday lives, felt compelled to fashion his handmaid of theology, 
metaphysics, to round out his exposition of human thought. Thus, he 
contributed his reflections upon ontology, the nature of being, and upon 
cosmology, the orderly system of the universe. His logical next step was 
epistemology: what are the limits and validity of the nature and grounds of 
human knowledge? In making that determination, must the heart ever be 
in tension with the head? Must there be an unending conflict of faith and 
reason? 
It is not mere happenstance that the Renaissance was preceded by three 
philosophers who strove to meld faith with reason. Each represented a 
child of Abraham, with the earlier informing the latter. Because Baghdad 
was the ancient fountain of learning, one is not surprised to see Islam lead 
the way in the form of Avicenna. Born in Persia in the year 980, he was 
the first supreme ontologist.38 He was followed by the Hebrew sage 
Maimonides in the twelfth century. An irrepressible rationalist, the 
contribution of Maimonides to the humanism of the Renaissance would be 
difficult to exaggerate.39 Capping them all was the Dominican, Thomas 
Acquinas.40 Building upon a foundation of Aristotle, who he referred to as 
“the philosopher,” Acquinas framed the theory of natural law that innately 
led to that flowering of human knowledge we know as the Renaissance.41 
His fusion of faith and reason followed a simple formula: God made 
humans and gave them the power to reason.42 Thus, the product of that 
reason is also sovereign principle. That is why Jefferson, at the outset of 
the Declaration of Independence, could refer to natural law as “the Laws 
of Nature and of Nature’s God.”43
In our present day, discussions and debates regarding the tensions 
between faith and reason generally rest in the province of the religious 
functionaries and of the students of ethics that reside in colleges and 
universities. As the world shrinks, the pressures for global, as distinct from 
merely Christian, ecumenism create an unquestionable urgency. Mere 
 
 
 38. STRUMPF, supra note 27, at 163; SEYYED H. HASR, THREE MUSLIM SAGES 25 (1964). 
 39. PAUL JOHNSON, A HISTORY OF THE JEWS 179, 190 (1987). 
 40. SABINE, supra note 27, at 250; STRUMPF, supra note 27, at 171-72. 
 41. SABINE, supra note 27, at 249; STRUMPF, supra note 27, at 173; JOHN H. HALLOWELL, MAIN 
CURRENTS IN MODERN POLITICAL THOUGHT 28 (1950). For a compendium of their work, see Allen N. 
Sultan, Judicial Autonomy Under International Law, 21 U. DAYTON L. REV. 585, 597-613 (1996). 
 42. LLOYD L. WEINREB, NATURAL LAW AND JUSTICE 55 (1987). 
 43. UNITED STATES DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE (U.S. 1776). 
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academic studies or inter-religious moral dialogues44 about substantive 
differences no longer suffice. Rather, contemporary realities demand that 
comparative religious ethics be placed in the service of reaching practical 
agreements that “might help alleviate human suffering and otherwise 
advance human well-being.”45
Clearly, this present effort had been illuminated by the prescient C.S. 
Lewis during the middle of the last century.46 His work reflected an 
understanding of the need to frame a concrete commonality of conclusions 
from discussions that date back at least to the 1839 World’s Parliament of 
Religions. However, interfaith discussions of “moral issues of general 
concern”47 is one thing; agreed upon documentary text is another. Only the 
latter can both inform and help authenticate any global constitutional 
paradigm. Should it have the imprimatur of both academics and religious 
functionaries, so much the better. 
Realization of such a documentary text melding the postures and 
objectives of both groups was finally realized48 at the 1993 Parliament of 
World Religions. Desirous of an agreed upon text, in 1992, the council 
that convened the Parliament authorized one of its members, Daniel 
Gómez-Ibáñez, to request Hans Küng, a theologian in Tubingen, 
Germany, to draft just such a document.49 Parliament members hoped that 
his text would establish a “global ethic” that would embrace a “moral 
consensus among the world’s religious and cultural traditions.”50 They 
realized to be stable or generally acceptable, such a proposed consensus 
must be “minimal” in nature, containing only the basic and essential, or a 
core, of agreement on such normative values.51 In this manner, “Toward a 
 
 
 44. This has been explained in the following manner: 
Interreligious moral dialogues seek to address the question of how we are to think about and 
respond to moral problems such as these in a religiously and culturally pluralistic world. These 
dialogues typically call upon the religions of the world, and upon all people of good will, to share 
responsibility for the creation of a more just and peaceful order at local, regional, and global 
levels. 
Bruce Grelle, Scholarship and Citizenship: Comparative Religious Ethicists as Public Intellectuals, in 
EXPLOCATION IN GLOBAL ETHICS (Sumner B. Twiss & Bruce Grelle eds., 1998) [hereinafter Twiss & 
Grelle]. 
 45. Summer B. Twiss & Bruce Grelle, Introduction: A New Venue for Comparative Religious 
Ethics, in Twiss & Grelle, supra note 44, at 1, 2. 
 46. C.S. LEWIS, THE ABOLITION OF MAN 95-121 (1947). 
 47. Twiss & Grelle, supra note 44, at 1. 
 48. Id. at 3-4. 
 49. Sallie King, A Global Ethic in the Light of Comparative Religious Ethics, in Twiss & Grelle, 
supra note 44, at 119. 
 50. Twiss & Grelle, supra note 44, at 2. 
 51. King, supra note 49, at 124. 
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Global Ethic (an Initial Declaration)” was proclaimed by the 1993 
Parliament.52
The legitimacy of this document, of course, depends upon how 
accurately it reflects truly global, and not merely Western, values of life, 
world view, religious faith, and the resulting propriety of human behavior. 
Measured by these standards, this recent compendium of absolute norms 
of human morality has much to commend its substantive authenticity. 
Purposefully minimal in number, these norms appear unchallengeable by 
any measure of humanitarian enlightenment. Such agreement, however, 
raises the question of their interpretation and application: that is the next 
challenge! Such concerns are obviously predicated upon the document’s 
eventual acceptance. 
What then, is the potential utility of the “global ethic” as a foundational 
instrument to inform a new paradigm of global constitutional law? The 
answer lies in the efficacy of three aspects of the document: its universal 
nature, the validity of its basic substantive provisions, and the anticipated 
problems of the latter’s application.  
Regarding the issue of its universality, the document possesses 
considerable legitimacy. One only has to reflect upon its theological and 
philosophical assumptions to conclude that the document has much to 
commend it: 
Item: Every competent introductory course in philosophy indicates 
that, independent of each other, every major religious tradition of 
the world has procreated its own version of “the golden rule.” 
Clearly, Hans Küng embraced this commonality of religious 
cultures, which is merely the epitome of social and political 
common sense.53 Thus, the overarching mandate of his draft: “There 
is a principle which is found and has persisted in many religious and 
ethical traditions of humankind for thousands of years: What you do 
not wish done to yourself, do not do to others! Or in positive terms: 
What you wish done to yourself, do to others! This should be the 
irrevocable, unconditional norm for all areas of life . . . .”54
 
 
 52. Id. at 119. 
 53. Twiss & Grelle, supra note 44, at 1-2; Fernando R. Tison, International Human Rights and 
Cultural Relationism, in HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE WORLD COMMUNITY 43-44 (Richard Pierre Claude & 
Burns H. Weston eds., 1992); HENRY J. STEINER & PHILIPS ALSTON, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS 
IN CONTEXT 219-25 (1996). 
 54. Küng & Kuschel, supra note 37, at 23-34, 71-72 (emphasis removed), cited in King, supra 
note 51, at 119-20. 
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Item: In preparation for his draft, Küng “consulted with over a 
hundred scholars and representatives of world religions.”55 Like the 
United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights,56 the 
document represents all, not just Western, value systems.  
Item: In preparing the draft, Küng made “an obvious effort” to 
utilize “ancient ethical codes found in the world’s religions.”57  
Item: The participating signatories of the document were religious 
leaders of the following religions: Baha’is, Brahmanism, 
Kumharism, Buddhism, Christianity, practitioners of native 
religions, Hinduism, Jainism, Judaism, Islam, neo-pagans, Sikhism, 
Taoism, Theosophistism, and Zoroastrianism.58  
Given the care in its preparation and promulgation, the general 
representative religious universality of the Global Ethic would be difficult 
to challenge. 
Turning to its basic substantive provisions, the document simply 
declares that human behavior should be guided by four “directions” 
distilled from “ancient ethical codes found in the world’s religions.” The 
ancient ethical codes are: 
1. Commitment to a culture of non-violence and respect for life. 
2. Commitment to a culture of solidarity and a just economic order. 
3. Commitment to a culture of tolerance and a life of truthfulness. 
4. Commitment to a culture of equal rights and partnership between 
men and women.59
Making absolutely no claim to replace either the scripture or the cultus, 
or forms of worship of any religion, these minimal propositions can be 
said to serve as a beacon for any just society. This necessarily includes any 
global society based upon the precepts of liberty, civil equality, justice, 
and other human rights. Clearly, these are consentaneous, valid, 
substantial provisions. Moreover, they are the product of highly 
acknowledged referents, such as natural law, divine will, natural reason, 
 
 
 55. King, supra note 51, at 119. 
 56. See, e.g., PAUL GORDON LAUREN, The EVOLUTION OF INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS, 
219-25 (1998). 
 57. King, supra note 51, at 120. 
 58. Id. at 120 (citing Küng & Kuschel, supra note 37, at 37-39). 
 59. Id. at 120-22; Küng & Kuschel, supra note 37, at 24-34. 
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cosmology, and the values necessary for an enlightened life.60 For who 
will vote for murder, theft, deceit, bigotry, and starvation? Therein lies the 
validity of these principles of a “global ethic” as a foundational 
instrument. 
When one looks to the last concern, that of anticipated problems of 
implementation of these values, a myriad of specifics can easily infest the 
mind. At the outset, we must summarily dismiss the rantings of the various 
and sundry despots who claim “cultural relativism”61 from human rights 
obligations to simply justify the repression so necessary to maintain their 
own absolute power.62 Similarly, those egomaniacs tying themselves to an 
established, respected religion, who mouth religious ideology and then 
sleep with every young girl above the age of twelve in their Waco, Texas 
compound, or fly airplanes into buildings, must also be completely 
ignored. In any discussion of religion that hopes to make the slightest 
claim to legitimacy, they are nothing less than pariahs who must be cast 
out from the true faith that they so inimically desecrate—period. 
That leaves the serious claims of certain non-violent, yet ideologically 
rigid fundamentalist groups, indigenous to virtually all religions, who 
claim their interpretation to be the only true application of their respective 
scripture. To use a contemporary phrase, to them, as far as religion is 
concerned, “it’s my way or the highway.” Of necessity, their rigid posture 
rejects any notion of “a shared vision of moral and social values 
compatible with a variety of religious and cultural world views,” any 
“unity within a diversity.”63 In other words, they are, at this point in time, 
constitutionally incapable of embracing any “moral consensus (that is 
legally enshrined) among diverse nations and traditions that have openly 
acknowledged their mutual recognition of the human importance of these 
values.”64 Thus, they constitute a “stumbling block,” a clear and present 
challenge, since they completely reject the necessary “public recognition 
grounded in shared historical experience of what life can be like without 
these conditions fulfilled.”65 In sum, numerous recent examples of 
 
 
 60. Sumner B. Twiss, Religion and Human Rights: A Comparative Perspective, in Twiss & 
Grelle, supra note 44, at 155, 162-63. 
 61. See, e.g., HENRY J. STEINER & PHILIP ALSTON, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS IN 
CONTEXT 323-402 (2d ed. 2000); Fernando R. Tesón, International Human Rights and Cultural 
Relativism, in HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE WORLD COMMUNITY 42 (Richard Pierre Claude & Bruns H. 
Weston eds., 1992); Jack Donnelly, Cultural Relativism and Universal Human Rights, 6 HUM. RTS. Q. 
400, 410-19 (1984). 
 62. King, supra note 51, at 136; Lauren, supra note 56, at 272-74. 
 63. Twiss, supra note 60, at 162. 
 64. Id. 
 65. Id. 
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genocide and the continuing instances of contemporary starvation—our 
“shared historical experience”—are simply not sufficient to adjust their 
absolutist interpretation of religious doctrine.  
The response to that inflexible posture by members of the “global 
ethics” community has been usually antipodal in nature. One group says, 
in effect, that “it’s useless to try—simply cut them loose” and continue 
without their participation.66 Others opt for perseverance. They contend 
that the “global” ethic, to be truly “universal,” must include even those 
who presently practice religious exclusiveness. Thus, Sumner Twiss holds: 
Although it is true that fundamentalist movements are generally 
suspicious of international human rights, which they tend to 
associate with the “demonic” secularism of the modern world, it is 
not entirely true to say that they lack values and commitments 
resonant with human rights. For example, many of these movements 
deplore war, torture, and genocide—attitudes clearly consistent with 
individual and collective rights to physical security and suggestive 
of some shared ground. Moreover, most of these movements are 
deeply and actively committed to advancing practical measures for 
adequate nutrition, housing, medical care, education, and other 
essential social services, positioning them positively in relation to 
second-generation human rights. (Economic, social, and cultural 
rights). To be sure, such matters as gender equality and freedom of 
thought and expression remain deeply contested issues for 
fundamentalists, but the approach I have been developing 
demonstrates at least some ground for comparison and dialogue of a 
constructive sort, keeping open the possibility that these movements 
may in the future find internal resources for accepting more fully 
and self-consciously the international consensus on human rights.67
This latter approach of anticipatory inclusion must be embraced for 
obvious political purposes. Any model or representative cannon of global 
ethics that serves to both inform and buttress any paradigm of global 
constitutional law must be as universal as is possible. In the end, James 
Madison was correct: The constitutional umbrella should be made to cover 
the maximum “sphere”—the most peoples, the greatest territorial areas, 
the most factions and parties, the maximum amount of interests.68 In sum, 
 
 
 66. King, supra note 51, at 129-30. 
 67. Twiss, supra note 60, at 172 (citing RELIGION AND HUMAN RIGHTS 27-28 (John Kelsay & 
Sumner Twiss eds., 199)). 
 68. THE FEDERALIST NOS., 10, 51 (James Madison). 
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we must persevere to include them by convincing them of the 
commonality of our objectives and of the benefits that they will produce. 
A global ethic to which almost all identify will engender both 
individual and general allegiance and support for the necessary global 
constitutional institutions designed to implement its norms and precepts. 
Such a system of constitutionalism built upon this virtual universal moral 
consensus will, then, have a far greater possibility of success—to the 
betterment of all nations and peoples that it serves. 
V. PROACTIVE RESPONSIBILITY 
“Do your duty in all things. You cannot do more. You should never do 
less.”  
— Robert E. Lee69
As indicated above, the marriage of moral instincts to global communal 
action lights the path ahead. This marriage illuminates the compelling 
need for a global constitutional paradigm, informed by our global ethic, 
and founded upon the rule of law in the service of human rights. Such a 
realization demands pervasive and comprehensive efforts of good will, a 
simple function of the moral imperative. Among them is the recognition 
and application of what both history and the human mind tells us of the 
existence of inherent truths in human actions.70
We must begin with a heightened recognition of the principle of 
responsibility on the part of both individuals and of officials acting in his 
or her public capacity. At times wanting in many local and national human 
relationships, such responsibility appears to be, until relatively recently, 
often seriously lacking on the international plane, even though it has 
presently been embraced by all three regional human rights treaty 
regimes.71 It is true that there have been some heartening improvements: 
 
 
 69. Quoted in Sandra Day O’Connor, Eulogy for Justice L. Powell (Aug. 31, 1998), in 20 ABA 
NATIONAL SECURITY LAW REPORT 1, 3 (No. 4, Nov. 1998). 
 70. This chapter is inspired by, and draws heavily from Roger Rosenblatt’s essay, The 
Commission Report: The Law of the Mind, TIME, Feb. 21, 1983, at 39 (dealing with the Israeli Kahan 
Commission’s report on the responsibility of Ariel Sharon for a Beruit massacre of Palestinian 
refugees). 
 71. A recent “landmark” Decision of the African Commission on Human and Peoples Rights 
points out, inter alia that: 
Governments have a duty to protect their citizens, not only through appropriate legislation and 
effective enforcement but also by protecting them from damaging acts that may be perpetrated by 
private parties (See Union des Jeunes Avocats/Chad). This duty calls for positive action on part of 
governments in fulfilling their obligation under human rights instruments. The practice before 
other tribunals also enhances this requirement as is evidenced in the case Velásquez Rodríguez v. 
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“superior orders” was rejected as a defense at Nuremberg;72 “command 
responsibility” has been increasingly strengthened at ongoing international 
criminal trials in The Hague. And, of course, the Israel Kahan 
Commission Report73 in 1983 made a valuable and not sufficiently 
recognized contribution: It both impressively articulates, and then fully 
embraces, the jurisprudential concept of proactive responsibility. 
One can place varied labels on this doctrine of individual fault that, 
when violated, is often the harbinger of disaster. Significantly, proactive 
responsibility has deep roots in the Judeo-Christian tradition, and was 
considered a sin of omission by Thomas Acquinas.74 Presently, the 
doctrine takes varied forms in municipal legal systems. For example, the 
degree of citizen-to-citizen and citizen-to-state responsibility deemed 
actionable as criminal or civil fault, including negligence, is clearly greater 
in nations embracing the civil law than in their common law counterparts. 
Because the former system is based on the Roman law tradition, it protects 
individuals’ liberties equally, or as much as, the latter that follow the 
English common law. This fact suggests that such “indirect responsibility” 
clearly presents absolutely no threat to any regime of human rights. Stated 
another way, proactive or indirect responsibility poses no danger to the 
personal dignity of every individual that the civil and political rights of 
such legal regimes are designed to pervasively foster. 
Individual civil rights and liberties are one thing. The responsibility of 
officialdom to those human rights is another. Thus, the swift expansion of 
this common sense doctrine of proactive responsibility by necessity 
focuses only upon the latter, upon those who wield political power and 
upon their proxies. The proposition has been both eloquently and 
succinctly stated by one highly respected writer, Roger Rosenblatt: 
 
 
Honduras. In this landmark judgment, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights held that when 
a State allows private persons or groups to act freely and with impunity to the detriment of the 
rights recognised, it would be in clear violation of its obligations to protect the human rights of its 
citizens. Similarly, this obligation of the State is further emphasised in the practice of the 
European Court of Human Rights, in X and Y v. Netherlands. In that case, the Court pronounced 
that there was an obligation on authorities to take steps to make sure that the enjoyment of the 
rights is not interfered with by any other private person. 
15th Annual Activity Report, SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC RIGHTS ACTION CENTER & THE CENTER FOR 
ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL RIGHTS V. NIGERIA, Communication 155/96 ¶ 57 (2001-2002). 
 72. Rosenblatt, supra note 70; EDWARD M. WISE & ELLEN S. PODGER, INTERNATIONAL 
CRIMINAL LAW CASES AND MATERIALS 517-18. See also id. 615-16, 707-08; BROWNLIE, supra note 
28, at 562. 
 73. Id. 
 74. Id. 
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. . . when someone in authority is told that he ought to have 
anticipated a disaster, it means that the grand total of his 
professional experience and knowledge demanded, beyond 
reasonable doubt, that he behave differently than he did. Indeed, it 
is also beyond reasonable doubt that he merely forgot or tossed 
aside all that professional experience and knowledge when he 
neglected to act. Thus, ‘You should have known,’ in certain 
circumstances, becomes a way of elegantly telling someone he’s a 
liar, a liar more to himself than to others, possibly, but a liar 
nonetheless. 
What this says about human nature is that one cannot escape his 
own knowledge; he cannot be baptized innocent on a moment’s 
notice; nor may he be born again whenever difficulties make rebirth 
convenient. What this says about the comprehensiveness of reality 
is more far-reaching . . . In other words, . . . another, deeper reality 
(is) in the works, the reality of the silent connections the mind 
makes between experience and reason.75
True, under this paradigm of enhanced official responsibility, gross 
incompetence and shallow carelessness can have serious consequences. 
This should be welcomed. It brings the guarantee that such types of 
individuals will have increasingly less control over the lives and fortunes 
of the great multitude of all the rest of us who are less protected. Indeed, in 
some circumstances we are not at all protected. With this doctrine possible 
future atrocities resulting from the abuse of political power would be 
deterred. Given a viable system of international action, we could look to a 
time when such official criminal behavior can no longer scar the human 
condition. Since the surfeit of such horrors continue to this day, proactive 
responsibility should not be summarily dismissed by cannons of sophistry. 
If global peace is to grow, international responsibility must be its 
handmaiden. 
Such liability would not in any way compromise our rock-bottom 
principle of individual guilt that can be traced back to the opening pages of 
the Book of Genesis, and is one of the foundations of any enlightened 
society.76 Clearly, we have long recognized that an accused can be found 
guilty of the most heinous crime of murder upon a sufficient amount of 
purely circumstantial evidence. Can we then in good conscience absolve 
 
 
 75. Id. 
 76. Sultan, supra note 40, at 586-88. 
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the inaction by political leaders who we have every reason to believe know 
of the evils committed on their watch? In technical terms, holding them 
accountable is nothing more than a solid application of the present 
criminal requirement of the concurrence of both action (also justified by 
inaction) and guilty knowledge or intent. Because proactive responsibility 
by officialdom and their proxies satisfies all three principles—act, intent, 
and their concurrence—guilt is obviously justified. 
Harry Truman’s famous desk plaque “the buck stops here,”77 clearly 
states the principle of official accountability so vital to any civilized 
society. Proactive responsibility to deter “the sins of omission”78 is merely 
a vitally necessary expansion of that simple, true proposition. Both public 
morality and common sense demand that this truth be recognized and 
embraced by the global civil body politic. We need no experts of the 
human mind, or of religion, to implement the obvious, that which is 
known to all. The private consciences of public actors are matters of 
public concern when they import devastation on the innocent. 
Welcome to the real world. 
 
 
 77. Truman Presidential Museum and Library, “The Buck Stops Here” Desk Sign, at 
http://www.trumanlibrary.org/buckstop.htm (last modified Feb. 20, 2003). 
 78. See supra note 73. 
 
Washington University Open Scholarship
